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Abstract 
Artists and record labels within the music industry generally value artistic expression and profit making with 
varying degrees, and, hence, they may be modelled as a heterogeneous population of producers. It is argued that 
the internet not only encourages the appearance of artists who prioritise artistic expression over profits, but also 
raises the level of the listeners’ awareness about this distinction; this, in turn, is possible to prompt record com-
panies adjust their marketing strategies accordingly. Assuming that consumers have an incentive to support artis-
tic motivation, it is shown that the greater the dimension of the heterogeneity, the more accurately the consumer 
can reward artists with no solely profit making intentions, contingent on the consumer’s beliefs and behavioral 
profile. This leads to the conclusion that consumers may experience an increase in the utility derived from pur-
chasing music, an assertion that might seem counterintuitive in today’s digital economy. 
Keywords: economics of entertainment, psychological game theory, social networks, digital economy. 
 
Introduction© 
It seems to be a general consensus within the enter-
tainment industry circles that the internet has had an 
overall negative effect on the recording industry in 
terms of sales and profits. The justification for this 
view lies in the assertion that use of the internet has 
led to a direct decrease in sales caused by listeners 
who use file-sharing programs to illegally acquire 
music recordings for free. Although it cannot be 
denied that such practices harm the music industry 
and constitute disrespect against artistic creation, 
what is not mentioned very often is that a significant 
fraction of listeners actively support musicians fi-
nancially, even in cases when they do not have to. 
The most well-known example is that of recording 
band Radiohead, who, in 2007, let listeners them-
selves determine the price they would pay for 
downloading the band’s new album. Most people 
who downloaded the album set a positive price, al-
though paying nothing was also available as a choice. 
A multitude of other similar examples vividly show 
that listeners sometimes are more than willing to 
reward musicians and pay for the music they listen 
to (rather than acquire it for free). Another remark-
able case in point is the website kickstarter.com, 
where artists (not exclusively musicians) directly 
ask for funding of their projects, and the actual 
participation of people who contribute is surpris-
ingly big. If seen from the standard point of view 
of microeconomics, this “generosity” might seem 
paradoxical, because it seems to be inconsistent 
with utility maximisation. The aim of this paper is 
to explore these consumer behaviors on a theo-
retical basis, as well as their corresponding im-
pacts on musicians and record companies, in order 
to acquire a deeper understanding of how the  
digital economy has affected the recording industry. 
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The last decade has seen a rich literature that studies 
the effects of new technologies and the internet on 
the entertainment industry in general, and on the 
recording industry in particular. The work of Meisel 
and Sullivan (2002) was one of the first papers to 
delve on these issues, followed by Zhu and Mac-
Quarrie (2003), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) or 
Liebowitz (2005). Molteni and Ordanini (2003) con-
tain an empirical analysis on the new consumer be-
haviors, while Bockstedt et al. (2006) offers a com-
prehensive discussion on the new roles within the 
music industry established by the digital economy. 
It is interesting to note that, contrary to the consensus 
of several music industry representatives, most studies 
seem to converge to the assessment that the new prac-
tices brought in by the digital economy have done the 
music industry more good than harm: Peitz and Wael-
broeck (2006) illustrate that the negative effect from 
reduced sales due to illegal downloading may be over-
compensated by an increase in sales, prompted by the 
listeners’ being able to sample before they buy, a view 
which is consistent with Gopal et al. (2006). Ober-
holzer and Strumpf (2007) attempt an empirical study 
of the effect of downloads on sales, and find this effect 
to be statistically non-existent. Patokos (2008) ex-
plores the possibilities for all actors within the music 
industry (consumers, artists and record companies) to 
be made better off in the digital economy, while An-
dersen and Frenz (2010) adopt an evolutionary ap-
proach to argue that there is no association between 
music downloaded for free and record sales. 
Most of the above studies mention that consumers 
may show an increased willingness to buy music 
when they have access to file downloading, and 
hence, they can be fully (or, at least, better) informed 
about the quality of a music recording. This volume 
of information was not possible before the internet, 
when consumers would only be able to sample a lim-
ited selection of releases that would be promoted 
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through radio and/or television. This increased level 
of information accessible to the consumers does not 
exclusively relate to the quality of music, but also on 
its availability: listeners can now be exposed to the 
artistic creations of musicians who are not necessarily 
supported by big record companies, and who would 
be under the radar without the internet. This means 
that, contrary to what happened in the era before the 
internet, big record companies, smaller ones and 
standalone artists have begun to compete on almost 
equal terms. Moreover, the listeners can be made 
aware of this distinction between record companies 
of different sizes, and because of this, their willing-
ness to support the recording industry may be as-
sumed to be contingent on what the consumers per-
ceive the motivations of the record companies to be. 
Indeed, observation of consumer behaviors on the 
internet indicates that listeners are more inclined to 
support independent artists and smaller record 
companies that do not have the promotional re-
sources of bigger record companies. This paper 
investigates this issue by offering a theoretical ex-
planation based on psychological game theory. The 
beginning assumption is that consumers are able to 
distinguish (because of the internet, and subjec-
tively, to a degree) between profit maximising re-
cord companies and music production entities, 
whose primary aim is not making profits. It is natu-
ral to assume that the listeners’ behaviors will dif-
fer according to their perceptions on whether, and 
to what degree, a musician or a record company 
operates on a non-profit-maximising agenda. In 
simpler terms, consumers may take into account 
the motivations of the producers and be willing to 
reward the producers who have artistic (as opposed 
to solely profit-maximising) intentions. 
The main theoretical framework that implements the 
above intuitive facts is described in Section 2, fol-
lowing a brief introductory discussion on the het-
erogeneity of record companies in Section 1. Sec-
tion 3 explores the record companies’ reactions to 
the new consumer behaviors analysed in Section 2, 
and Section 4 offers a generalisation of the basic 
model of Section 3. We find that the greater the 
heterogeneity within record companies, the more 
accurately a consumer will be able to distinguish 
between different types and adjust his or her be-
havior accordingly. The insight from this finding 
is that the new digital setting can be very benefi-
cial for standalone musicians and smaller record 
companies; bigger record companies are not ex-
cluded from these benefits, as long as they place 
the focus on better output quality (given that con-
sumers are assumed to not be as willing to support 
them as they do with smaller record companies). 
1. Heterogeneity within the recording industry 
If seen from a high enough level, the music industry 
can be considered as a standard market, consisting 
of producers and consumers, the commodities pro-
duced being music recordings. To allow for some 
more detail entails the acknowledgment that what 
can be seen as a “firm” in the music industry can be 
divided into two separate production entities. On the 
one side, there is the very creation of the music by 
the artist, which, in principle, involves inspiration 
and talent. On another level, there is everything else 
that is needed for this music to reach the listener – a 
large diversity of duties, such as the assignment of 
sound engineers, the labour of the workers who will 
manufacture the physical products in the factory, the 
advertisers’ promotional efforts or the distributors’ 
tasks. Therefore, even if both artists and record com-
panies jointly constitute “the firm”, it makes more 
sense to see them as distinct actors; the role of the 
former is to create the “raw material” (that is, the mu-
sic), while the role of the latter is to refine it (for ex-
ample, do the packaging or the publishing) and sell it. 
The aforementioned two categories of labour, differ 
in that each artist’s labour is indispensable, in the 
sense that the output would be entirely different, 
were the artist to be replaced by another. In contrast, 
the rest of the labour needed could be performed by 
anyone having the corresponding skills. This means 
that record companies depend strongly on artists, as 
they can not exist unless they employ artists’ labour. 
Artists themselves depend on record companies too, 
because they use them as a means to create a final 
product that shall be up for sale. 
This interdependence between artists and record 
companies has not the same weight both ways. 
While record companies would not exist if there was 
no artistic creation, artists are not incapable of per-
forming the rest of the tasks needed for the music to 
reach the consumer themselves. Most usually 
though, artists choose to work for a record company 
because they find it optimal (less costly) too. How-
ever, there always have been artists who preferred to 
circumvent record companies and have total control 
of their output, being creators and sellers at the same 
time. Because of this, along with the existence of 
the big record companies, there have been smaller 
“independent” ones (or “labels” as they are often 
called), usually run by artists themselves, or, to put 
it differently, by people with some artistic vision. 
Introduction of new technologies and the existence 
of the internet became a considerable facilitator for 
the creation of such recording labels. With produc-
tion processes becoming cheaper, promotion duties 
being made easy to handle even from home, and 
communication with anyone being possible at al-
most zero cost, a large portion of artists found it af-
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fordable to set up their own company instead of be-
ing represented by a bigger one. Hence, if before the 
1990s making music without the backup of a record 
company seemed a somewhat “brave” decision, it 
has now become a phenomenon that is hardly un-
usual in the music industry. Independent labels have 
multiplied in the last few years and can range from 
bigger ones that can compete directly with the com-
panies of the corporate industry, to standalone artists 
who simply record and/or produce their own CDs 
themselves and sell their music through the internet. 
It must be stressed that what initially makes the in-
dependent labels a separate entity from the big re-
cord companies is not the size in itself, and certainly 
not a matter of who makes the decisions and runs 
the business; what generally distinguishes these two 
sides of the recording industry is a difference in 
ends: the corporate record companies are profit-
making firms, while the independent labels may fol-
low other incentives. For example, there exist inde-
pendent labels that sell their CDs at almost half the 
standard price; such a pricing policy would seem irra-
tional for a profit-maximising company, but it would 
be perfectly rational for a firm which, for example, 
values customer satisfaction more than the actual 
profits. Obviously, it is often a thin line to strictly 
distinguish profit-making companies from others, as 
all of them are concerned to one degree or another 
with profits; it nevertheless seems plausible to begin 
by entertaining the hypothesis that smaller companies 
exist for primary reasons other than making profits, 
because if making profits was the main aim, they 
would not choose to be independent in the first place 
(but rather, be part of a corporate company). 
Except for making the creation of more independent 
labels possible, the internet has also been decisive in 
raising the consumers’ awareness about this hetero-
geneity in music production. The mainstream music 
press is no longer the usual resource for music-
related news and opinions; consumers have now 
access to a much wider information set, formed by 
people within and outside the recording industry. In 
many cases, they can even communicate directly 
with the artists and sample their work, either legally 
(by listening to the audio excerpts available in al-
most every artist’s webpage) or illegally (by using 
file-sharing programs). What is really important that 
while listeners’ opinion previously was, in a sense, 
directed by the will of the media and by the record 
companies that had the most money to spend, it is 
now formed by many alternative sources, and is 
based on a wider knowledge on how the industry 
works and what its motives are. 
The figure below shows this effect on the network 
formed by the recording industry and the consum-
ers; the network on the lower half of the figure re-
flects a setting before the internet: the recording in-
dustry consists of two entities. Entity A includes the 
big record companies and entity B independent art-
ists and labels. The tie connecting the consumers 
with entity B is weak, because the consumer has 
little access to these artists’ works and communica-
tion is almost non-existent. On a micro-level, this 
translates to the fact that a fraction of consumers are 
totally unaware of the existence of group B (and 
thus, are not connected with them at all). The effect 
of the internet is reflected on the network on the up-
per half of the figure in two ways: entity B has be-
come bigger, and the tie connecting it with the con-
sumers is strong. It is interesting to notice that the 
internet bridges the structural hole that used to exist 
(see, Burt, 2003), and hence, provides new opportuni-
ties and benefits for the parties involved (group B and 
consumers, in our setting). The next section offers a 
game theoretic model attempting to describe how 
consumers differentiate their behaviors according to 
their perceptions of the motivations of the different 
types of actors within the recording industry. 
 
Fig. 1. The weak link between consumers and standalone artists 
(bottom figure) becomes strong in the digital era (top figure) 
2. Consumers’ reactions to record companies 
motivations 
Consumers evaluate a work of art with a multitude of 
criteria. It seems plausible to assert that most of these 
criteria are product-specific, in the sense that they are 
directly related with the actual quality of the recording, 
as (subjectively) perceived by each listener. There are, 
however, other attributes linked to the product’s crea-
tion that can have an effect on the consumer’s deci-
sion-making, even if such characteristics are not re-
lated with the music itself. Since consumers are now 
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assumed to be aware of the distinction between profit-
making record companies and independent labels, it 
makes sense to argue that they use different criteria to 
evaluate the corresponding products. In other words, a 
consumer may evaluate a product released by a big 
record company in a different way than if the very 
same product came by a standalone artist. 
We have here a concept of economic action that dif-
fers from the conventional one in that the consumer 
is not constrained within the limits of a “rational 
actor” in the strict sense, but is modelled as an 
agent, who does not only evaluate a commodity in 
terms of price and utility, but rather sees it more like 
a “bundle” consisting of the physical product and 
the corresponding experiences, and within its ex-
plicit cultural parameters. Smelser and Swedberg 
(1994) provide a comprehensive discussion about 
this difference in concepts, which is one among the 
central issues in the comparison between economic 
sociology and mainstream economics. 
The explicit assumption we are making is that listen-
ers show an inclination to reward “good” motives, 
when they can acknowledge them, which accordingly 
means that they have a tendency to be more suppor-
tive of artists who run their own independent compa-
nies. This is not just based on intuition, but also on 
observed behavior (for example, consumers who are 
given the option to choose how much to pay for a 
recording coming from an independent artist usually 
choose to pay a non-zero amount). In contrast, con-
sumers are assumed not to have the same behavior 
when it comes to the companies of the corporate in-
dustry, and whose purpose is knowingly profit-
making. In this setting, it is understandable that being 
“independent” also becomes a signal of better quality, 
no matter whether this reflects reality or not. In gen-
eral, consumers might feel that a product released by 
an independent label carries more “artistic value” 
than a related good produced by a big record company, 
regardless of the fact that the actual enjoyment from 
listening to the latter might be greater: the very fact 
that the motivation for the existence of the former was 
creative force and not just an incentive to make money 
is enough to turn on some level of “positive bias” in 
the mind of the consumer, and thus, prompting a pen-
chant for supporting the specific product. 
To be more specific, if there is a product priced p > 0, 
and the consumer’s (indirect) utility from purchasing 
the product is a decreasing function of p and an in-
creasing function of its quality (denoted b), then a ra-
tional consumer (in the standard utility maximising 
sense), who would be able to acquire the product for 
free (for example, by access to a file-sharing program), 
would not choose to purchase the product. Because, 
now, the utility from purchasing this product (denoted 
uP) is greater than the utility from downloading it (uD) 
given the same price and quality, this means that for a 
given quality, there is a threshold price p* such that the 
consumer chooses to purchase rather than download, if 
p < p* (for a detailed elaboration, see Patokos, 2008). 
In addition to that, and given the assumption that 
the listener is intentionally willing to support inde-
pendent artists, it follows that they might rationally 
want to sacrifice some part of their utility in order 
to reward the well-meaning producers1. Thus, if for 
a product of some given quality, the consumer is 
willing to pay (up to) p* if it comes from a big re-
cord company and (up to) p** if it comes from an 
independent label, this assumption can then be writ-
ten as p** > p*, that is, the threshold price is greater 
if the recording comes from a standalone artist. 
The above framework suggests that we can define a 
“kindness function” fi for each consumer i, and then 
consider each person’s utility to depend on their 
“kindness”. This framework is essentially based on 
psychological game theory, following Geanakoplos 
et al. (1989) and Rabin (1993). We can assume fi as 
taking non-negative values, the value 0 representing 
no intention to support the producer at all, and an 
infinitely positive value representing a totally altru-
istic attitude which translates itself into rewarding 
the producer even when the product does not meet 
the consumer’s quality standards. A possible way to 
model our hypothesis would then be to write the 
utility function of consumer i from purchasing as  
vi = (1+fi)ui(p,b), where ui(·) is the utility from pur-
chasing, unaffected by any psychological parame-
ters; ui(·) is naturally a function of price p and qual-
ity b. If fi = 0 then vi = ui, which means that the lis-
tener has no intention of “rewarding” the producer, 
and therefore, their utility is solely determined by 
the price and the quality of the product (i.e., the 
framework collapses to the limit case where the 
consumer’s utility is not affected by his or her 
“kindness”). If fi > 0 then vi > ui, which accordingly 
means that the consumer values the product more 
highly (attains more utility) because of their own 
attitude to compensate the artist. Obviously, the 
higher fi is, the higher the utility, and the more the 
consumer will be willing to support the artist2. 
This behavioral profile is consistent with Granovetter 
(1985) and his claim that “[actors’] attempts at pur-
posive action are […] embedded in concrete, ongoing 
systems of social relations”. On the one hand, the 
consumers in this framework adjust their kindness 
according to what they believe the producer’s moti-
                                                     
1 For a comprehensive discussion on the notion of fairness, see Rabin (1993). 
In Rabin’s words, “people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-
being to help those who are being kind”. 
2 A different configuration for the utility function would not alter the analysis 
as long as the qualitative properties are preserved. 
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vations are; this adjustment does not necessarily fol-
low any socially predetermined rules, but rather, hap-
pens in an ad-hoc manner, according to the consum-
ers’ perceptions on who they are interacting with, and 
after having taken into account the implications of 
their actions in a social and cultural context. 
The introduction of kindness functions allows for a 
proof of the claim made earlier that p**> p*: let us fix 
the quality at some level b0, and suppose, at first, that 
fi = 0. Then, p* is the price defined by uD(0,b0) =  
= uP(p*,b0). If we now assume that fi takes some posi-
tive value, then p** shall be defined by uD(0,b0) =  
= (1+fi)·uP(p**,b0). It is obvious that these two defini-
tions imply that uP(p*,b0) = (1+fi)·uP(p**,b0). Because 
1+fi > 1 and the utilities from purchasing are decreas-
ing functions of price, it follows that p** > p*. An illus-
tration of this appears on Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Diagrammatic illustration of threshold values p* 
and p**, with p** > p* 
What is interesting to notice is that the consumer 
discriminates against record companies by setting a 
corresponding value for fi. At the same time, fi de-
pends on the record company’s profile and can, 
therefore, be understood as a kind of a “reaction 
function” of the consumer towards the record com-
pany’s attitude; the more profit-making the producer 
is thought to be, the more fi decreases and ap-
proaches zero. Obviously, the value of fi the con-
sumer decides upon need not reflect the record 
company’s intentions with accuracy; it is a parame-
ter that reflects the intentions that the consumer be-
lieves that the record company has. The implications 
of this are discussed in the next section, where we 
examine the record companies’ best responses to the 
new consumer behaviors of the digital economy. 
3. The types of record companies as signals 
for their intentions 
In the previous sections, it was argued that the re-
cording industry is a heterogeneous population, con-
sisting of big record companies and independent la-
bels. If we assume that this distinction is always clear 
to the consumer, and if we further let the consumer 
believe that big record companies are profit-making, 
while independent labels are not, it follows from the 
framework described in the previous section, that the 
respective products will be evaluated differently, even 
when they will not actually differ in price or quality. 
For reasons of simplicity, let us initially assume that 
there is a population of record companies normalized 
to 1, consisting of two types only, A and B. Firms of 
type A belong to the corporate industry, while firms of 
type B are independent. If q is the population of firms 
of type A, then the population of firms of type B is 1–
q, where q∈[0,1]. When consumer i evaluates a prod-
uct, coming from a company of type A, their fi is equal 
to zero, while when they evaluate a product, coming 
from a company of type B, their fi has some positive 
value, denoted fiB. If we take qualities of products by 
both companies to be the same, then, because p** > p*, 
companies belonging to type B would enjoy more 
profits than companies of type A, if demand was the 
same across A and B. The assertion that demand might 
be the same only makes sense because of the very ex-
istence of the internet, which allows promotion and 
exposure of independent artists in almost equal terms 
as the artists represented by bigger companies; before 
the internet, it was only natural that demand for inde-
pendent releases was, in general, substantially lower 
than the demand for mainstream releases. 
It would then seem, by this analysis, that this dis-
crimination upon record companies helps independ-
ent labels, and this accordingly would mean that the 
internet can be seen as an enabler for artistic creation 
that is not directly or primarily linked with profit-
making. Nevertheless, this result would only be valid 
provided the actions of the consumers who did not 
have an impact on the strategies of the firms. If, now, 
record companies acknowledge the consumers’ in-
centive to “reward” independent labels and can infer, 
because of this, that profits shall be greater for those 
labels, then 1–q will understandably rise, for newer 
firms wishing to enter the recording industry shall 
find it optimal to belong to type B (for example, by 
advertising themselves as being “independent”); of 
course, a rise in 1–q is not a problem in itself, but 
what shall happen is that these entrants shall prefer to 
be tagged as “independent” and be of type B, regard-
less of whether they are profit-maximizing or not. 
The conclusion is that the type alone of a record 
company cannot be a reliable signal about the com-
pany’s motivations. If the listeners use it as such, in 
an attempt to reward non-profit-making firms, then 
the evolution of the system will bring about a popu-
lation of type B actors only (q=0 in the long run) 
that shall incorporate profit-maximizing companies 
too, and therefore, the type shall eventually reveal 
nothing to the listeners: therefore, although the re-
cording industry may still be heterogeneous, the 
consumers are unable to engage into different 
strategies because they cannot know the firms’ true 
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intentions. Consumers can then only have probabil-
istic expectations and fix their own fi according to 
any subjective criteria they find appropriate. 
It is interesting to notice that this conclusion is on par 
with Burt (2003), who asserts that network closure 
can be critical for benefits from bridging a structural 
hole to be realized. Indeed, had we assumed a closed 
network, the dynamic structure of the system would 
disappear and the heterogeneity, as seen from the 
consumer’s viewpoint, would not collapse. 
4. Allowing for multiple record company types 
The assumption of the previous section that record 
companies can either be of type A or of type B 
made the whole setting seem somewhat “binary” 
and unrealistic. As was mentioned in the introduc-
tion, it is often not easy to distinguish between big 
record companies and smaller independent labels 
with accuracy. In reality, there are the big corporate 
businesses (such as EMI or Universal) and their 
numerous imprints (such as Maverick or Reprise), 
which are considered to be smaller firms within big-
ger firms. Then, there is a multitude of independent 
labels that range from companies that seem as 
strong and wealthy as the corporate firms (such as 
Beggars Banquet or Sub Pop) to negligible (in size) 
attempts (such as the self-called “micro-label” label 
Hinah, whose releases are burnt on CD-R individu-
ally, and in very few copies). The point here is that 
it would be more appropriate to assume a heteroge-
neous population like before, but rather than only 
have types A and B, also include every other type 
in-between. In theory, there would be a number of 
types equal to n, and if we let n→∞, we could even 
have a population of infinite heterogeneity, where 
consumers could encounter every possible firm pro-
file between the two extremes. 
If we now normalize the space between A and B to 
be the interval [0,1], all is needed is a one-to-one 
mapping from any value of that interval to a value of 
the kindness function such that fi(0) = 0, fi(1) = fiB and 
fi(x) > fi(y) if x > y. This mapping obviously captures 
the fact that the closer a record company is to the ex-
treme B, the more the consumer is willing to reward 
them. This is based on the reasoning that the closer a 
firm is to the extreme A, the more profit-making its 
intentions are believed to be (by the consumer). Let 
us also recall that the kindness function is subjective, 
and so is the consumer’s belief about where exactly 
in the interval [0,1] one company is located. 
The main difference with the previous case is that 
while in the “binary” setting the consumer could tell 
one firm’s type with certainty, such judgment here 
can only be an approximation based on the con-
sumer’s beliefs (which are, in their turn, generated 
by the media, including the internet). To draw an 
analogy, one can certainly tell the difference be-
tween black and white, but it is often not easy to tell 
the difference between two nuances of gray. 
Since being as close as possible to the extreme B is 
the best strategy for profit-making firms (ceteris pari-
bus), record companies shall try and create a reputa-
tion for being more on the right of the interval [0,1] 
than what they actually are. And in reality, this is 
what they do exactly: no record company, no matter 
its size, ever affirms they are “in it for the money”; in 
contrast, everyone, from the multi-million selling 
corporations to the standalone artist who runs a tiny 
business from home, seems to be in angst for creating 
an “artistic profile” that goes beyond profits. 
Nevertheless, record companies cannot send signals 
that are as misleading as perhaps is possible in the 
two-type case: in a binary setting, all a record com-
pany has to do in order to belong to type B is to 
choose and convey any value in the interval [0,1] 
above (and including) the threshold value 0.5. 
Therefore, if a company’s real type was located 
around 0.5 and above, the consumer could perceive 
it to be of type B. Now that there is an infinity of 
types, if the real type of a company is a value t in 
the interval [0,1], the company can only signal types 
in an interval [t, t+δ]1. The rationale behind this is 
that, no matter how the record company chooses to 
promote itself, and no matter the profile it wants to 
create, it can never deviate too much from the actual 
profile, because the consumer has access to informa-
tion (and various other signals) that cannot make 
them formulate a belief beyond t+δ. 
Consumers then expect a shift of types to the right, 
which will be at most equal to δ, and can therefore 
adjust the values of their kindness function accord-
ingly. In essence, the agent who believes that a firm 
j is of type t1, knows (courtesy of common knowl-
edge of rationality) that the true type of a firm shall 
be within the interval [t1–δ, t1]. Thus, while they 
were planning to set a value equal to fi(t1) before, 
they can now adopt a strategy of setting a value for 
the kindness function in the interval [fi(t1–δ), fi(t1)], 
according to their probabilistic expectations of firm 
j’s strategy. In other words, the consumers are 
prompted to follow a mixed strategy, where any 
value within [fi(t1–δ), fi(t1)] might be chosen, subject 
to the expected probability density of [t1–δ, t1]. 
The conclusion is, qualitatively, the same as in the 
two-type case: firms that truthfully reveal their type 
will suffer some loss and firms that send false sig-
nals shall be better off; but what is important here is 
that, because of the continuity of types, these imper-
                                                     
1 More precisely, it could signal types in an interval [t–e1, t+e2], but 
signalling below point t would never be a rational decision.  
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fections shall be smaller. Obviously, had the con-
sumer perfect information (that is, δ = 0), there would 
be no friction, and finally, the hypothesis that the 
type can be a signal for the firm’s intentions would 
become self-confirming. In any case, p** remains 
greater than p*, which means that the consumer’s 
attitude of fairness, combined with the internet as an 
enabler for independent artistic creation, generates 
more enjoyment for consumers overall. 
Obviously, a comparison between the frameworks 
of Sections 3 and 4 reveals that the more types 
available, the more accurately a consumer can infer 
that a type is revelatory of the firms’ intentions. This 
happens because when there are more types, the 
number of types a firm can make the consumer be-
lieve it belongs to becomes smaller. Thus, an in-
crease in the number of types brings in more accu-
racy, just like what happens with the number of lev-
els used to transform an analog signal into digital. 
Because everything here is nothing but beliefs in the 
mind of the consumer, it follows that it is optimal 
for the listener to act as if an infinity of types ex-
isted and accordingly adjust their behavior, rather 
than alternate between two or three only alternative 
strategies. This way, the social power of consumers 
– in the Harsanyi (1966) sense – is enhanced, for 
listeners can resist believing what the recording in-
dustry wants them to believe, at no cost to them. 
Discussion and conclusion 
The beginning point of this paper was that, because 
of the internet, listeners have now opportunities they 
would not be able to experience otherwise: the very 
fact that consumers became aware of the structure of 
the recording industry enabled them to acknowledge 
the existence of independent artists, as well as a va-
riety of art statements that go against the main-
stream. Therefore, the internet not only gave listen-
ers the opportunity to became acquainted with the 
works of artists that were not even known to exist, 
but it also gave consumers the possibility to have 
access to the artists’ creations directly, communicate 
with them and ultimately become an active part of 
the recording industry themselves by formulating 
psychological reactions towards the recording in-
dustry’s incentives. 
With considerably expanded information and choice 
sets, the consumer cannot be limited within the sug-
gestions of the music press or the radio (as was the 
case before the internet existed), and cannot be eas-
ily tricked into buying a recording that will fail to 
live up to the expectations. It would, thus, make 
sense to assert, as the framework of Section 2 illus-
trates on theoretical grounds, that these new ex-
periences made available to the listener enhance 
the average utility derived. Whether this increase 
in utility is enough to compensate for the loss of 
other psychological components that happened be-
cause of the internet (for example, digital 
downloads as substitutes for the physical product) 
is indeterminate, and it surely is consumer-specific. 
Artists themselves understandably enjoy greater 
benefits, for their target group is expanded, which 
means that they can potentially reach their audience, 
even if they are not supported by a big record com-
pany and an expensive promotional plan. The fact 
that independent artists and labels multiplied over 
the past decade is consistent with the analysis of 
Sections 2 to 4, as well as with the assumption that 
consumers are generally willing to support them. 
Because of this fact, it can be observed that being 
independent has, up to a degree, become a “trend” 
that is followed by artists not on aesthetic grounds 
or for reasons of artistic integrity, but simply because 
it generates more profits for them; this is nothing but 
a restatement of the conclusion of Section 3. As a 
consequence, distinguishing between independent 
and mainstream artists may not always be clear, but, 
as was seen in Section 4, it gets all the more accurate 
the more the consumer understands and acknowl-
edges the range of the differences between these two 
types of artists. If this happens, artists are not able to 
control the degree of “fairness” the consumer will 
show towards them, because they cannot send false 
signals about their motivations anymore. 
One of the central statements in marketing, as well as 
the economic sociology literature is that the larger a 
network is, the more its value becomes for its mem-
bers (Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994). As was seen, 
this is indeed what exactly happens for independent 
artists and labels; however, it is unsure whether the 
bigger record companies benefit from being “more 
connected”. This can be explained by the fact that 
connectedness eventually reveals false signals and 
potential attempts to sell lesser quality products. 
The message for the corporate industry is then more or 
less clear, and intuitively plausible; in contrast to the 
independent artists, since the big record companies are 
generally assumed unable to prompt positive values 
for the listener’s kindness function, they have one con-
trol variable less to influence the listener. What, thus, 
remains is the price and the quality. In other words, 
since the internet made the oligopoly of big record 
companies collapse and gave power to the listener by 
enabling them to have better information on quality of 
products and to reward the industry’s good intentions, 
the best response of the recording industry is to either 
drop the prices or improve the quality of its products 
(or both). The former has already been adopted as a 
policy by a fraction of the big record companies. With 
reference to the latter, and given that several published 
works show that file-sharing has not been proved to be 
harmful for the music industry (as was mentioned in 
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the introduction), it seems that if sales in music have 
actually decreased, maybe it is not file-sharing that is 
to blame, but low quality of output. It remains to be 
seen if the bigger record companies are going to at-
tempt a true shift to considering music recordings 
more like works of art than commodities up for sale. 
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